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NOTES AND COMMENTS
past,17 that a consent judgment merely evidences the agreement of the
parties and is not an adjudication of negligence.
In view of Pack it seems almost impossible in North Carolina for two
parties to settle a third-party-infant's claim and at the same time protect
their right to litigate the issue of damages between themselves. Either
the out-of-court settlement with the infant will be open to later disaf-
firmance, or the in-court settlement will bar future litigation between
the defendants.' 8 There is a possibility of a separate consent judgment
in favor of the infant against each of the defendants, as an injured party
may sue one or all joint tortfeasors.' 9 It is submitted that it should not
be necessary to use this cumbersome and uncertain procedure. The
writer believes that the North Carolina court should follow the reasoning
of the dissent in Pack, which would allow all parties to a controversy to
litigate their claims while at the same time encouraging the settlement of
suits by an infant.
CEARLES E. DAMERON III
Rule Against Perpetuities-Commercial Leases.
A leasehold to commence after the completion of a building was de-
clared void ab initio by the California District Court of Appeals in the
recent case of Haggerty v. City of Oakland' as a violation of the rule
against perpetuities.2 The City of Oaldand and one Goodman entered
into a written contract whereby the city was to build a building and
lease it to Goodman for a term of years. The term was not to com-
mence until the first day of the second month after completion of the
building. The lease contained no specified date for beginning construc-
tion on the building but did provide that the city "shall and will in good
faith immediately after the execution of this lease proceed with plans for
"The North Carolina Supreme Court, in holding an Ohio divorce decree not
to be a consent judgment, stated, "A judgment by consent is the agreement of the
parties.... It is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does
not purport to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the pre-
existing agreement of the parties." McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 719, 47
S.E.2d 27, 31 (1948).
" The holding in the principal case does not apply to actions involving a con-
tract. Stanley v. Parker, 207 N.C. 159, 176 S.E. 279 (1934).
" Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956) ; Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943). Since there can be only one recovery for
an injury, satisfaction of the infant's first consent judgment would bar a suit
against the second tortfeasor. Bell v. Hawkins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642(1958). Likewise, a release of one tortfeasor will bar an action against the other.
King v. Powell, 220 N.C. 511, 17 S.E.2d 659 (1942); Smith v. Thompson, 210
N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936).
1 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
' Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Spicer v. Moss, 409 II. 343, 100 N.E.2d 761 (1951) ; Johnson v. Preston, 226 I11.
447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C.
737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
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the construction ... and shall thereafter prosecute the same to comple-
tion with all due diligence." (Emphasis added.)
Haggerty, taxpayer of the City of Oakland, brought suit to have the
lease declared void, inter alia, on grounds that it violated the common
law rule against perpetuities4 as embodied in a California statute. The
court so held, reasoning that since there was an uncertain and unfixed
commencement date for the lease, a possibility existed that the estate
might not vest within twenty one years. This holding reflects genera-
tions of judicial adherence to the rule against perpetuities.
The classic definition of the rule against perpetuities, as stated by
Gray,6 is as follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." Basically the rule is one invalidating interests which
vest too remotely, so that postponement of possession or enjoyment is
not affected.7 If the time of the commencement of the interest is in-
definite, then the rule applies.8 It is not a rule of construction but a
positive mandate of law to be obeyed irrespective of intention and to
be applied even if accomplishment of the expressed intent of the grantor
is made impossible thereby.9
The ultimate purpose of the rule is to prevent the tying up of the
title to real property and to facilitate the use of land in commerce.10
Thus the rule concerns rights in real property only and does not affect
the making of contracts which do not create such rights."1 The authori-
ties are in conflict as to whether a lease is a contract, a conveyance, or
a conveyance with contractual obligations superimposed.12  However
' 161 Cal. App. 2d at -, 326 P.2d at 966.
'If the time within which a contingency must occur is not annexed to a life
in being, the period allowed for vesting is twenty one years from the interest's
creation. See Estate of McCollum, 43 Cal. App. 2d 313, 110 P.2d 721 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941) ; Smith v. Renne, 382 Ill. 26, 46 N.E.2d 587 (1943) ; Leach, Perpetuities
in a Nutshell, 51 HAiv. L. Rav. 638 (1938).
' CAL. Crv. ConE § 7152: "No interest in real or personal property shall be
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty one years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest.. . . It is intended by the enactment of
this section to make effective in this State the American common-law rule against
perpetuities"8 GRAY, TH E RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.2d 736 (1949) ; Forbringer v. Romao,
10 N.J. Super. 175, 76 A2d 825 (Ap. Div. 1950) ; McQueen v. Branch Bankihg
& Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E2d 831 (1952).
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 268 (Abr. ed. 1940) and cases there cited.
'Emerson v. Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1951) ; Monarski v. Greb,
407 Il. 281, 95 N.E.2d 433 (1950) ; Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229
(1949) ; Crockett v. Scott, 199 Tenn. 90, 284 S.W2d 289 (1955).1oGRAY, TIIE RuLE AGAINST PEUETUITIES §§ 1 4, 235 (4th ed. 1942).
Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co., 46 F2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 852
(1931); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Purcell, 244 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1951);.
First Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675
(1953) ; West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d
46 (1947).
See generally 25 N.C.L. Rnv. 516 (1946).
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the lease be classified in legal theory, if in fact it does create definite
rights in realty, then it must follow that the rule against perpetuities
applies. There seem to be relatively few cases discussing the rule as
applied to leases in futuro'3 but the leading text-writers agree14 that
no legally defined interest is vested and that, if a lease of a term for
years is to take effect on a condition precedent which may not occur
within the period of the rule, it -violates the rule and must fall.
There was a strong dissent in Haggerty based upon the proposition
that, under modem conditions and concepts, there could be no question
of the lease's failure to vest in interest within twenty one years. The
dissent said, "To hold that under modem economic conditions there is
even a bare possibility that a landlord and tenant ... would ever wait
over twenty one years for their lease to take effect is unrealistic, fan-
tastic and even absurd."'1  Rather, the dissent chose to emphasize the
"reasonable performance" feature of the lease agreement. The dissent-
ing judge would have followed an accepted rule of the law of contracts
and allowed the court to construe the phrase "with all due diligence" as
requiring performance within a "reasonable time."' 6
At first blush this seems to be the logical solution, but as the majority
points out, "This argument is deceptively simple, and is unsound."'7
Had the language of the instrument in the principal case been such as
to create a lease in prasent s'8 then the argument of the dissent would
have been in point. The lessee would have had a present right of pos-
session in the property, and the construction provision would have been
an incidental part of the lease. In a proper action the court could en-
force this contractual part of the lease agreement by determining what
would be a "reasonable time"'19 for completion of the building. No case
has been found, however, where such concepts of contract law have been
applied in resolving the question of when the lease vests an interest in
the lessee.
"
8 This note is dealing with a specific type of commercial interest, a lease limited
to commence in futuro, and does not explore the whole field of future interests to
which the rule against perpetuities is applicable.
"
4 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PamPETurriEs § 320.1 (4th ed. 1942) ; 3 SimEs &
SmiTH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1242 (2d ed. 1956); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PoPERT"
§406 (3rd ed. 1939).
" 161 Cal. App. 2d at - , 326 P.2d at 967-68.
" 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 360 (1939).1 161 Cal. App. 2d at - , 326 P.2d at 966.
"'A grant in prasenti imports a transfer, subject to the limitations mentioned,
of a present possessory interest in the lands designated. Van Wych v. Knevals,
106 U.S. 360 (1882).
19 E.g., Florence Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Hanby, 101 Ala. 15, 13 So.
343 (1893), contract to erect an electric light plant "as soon as possible"; Stark
v. Shaw, 155 Cal. App. 2d 171, 317 P.2d 182 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 937 (1958), where contract for roofing houses contained no commence-
ment date, but it was held that a promise to perform within a reasonable time
was implied; Western Land Roller Co. v. Schumacher, 151 Neb. 166, 36 N.W.2d
777 (1949), a contract to complete a well and install pump "as quickly as possible."
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The decision in the principal case has been criticized as hampering
land development under current commercial conditions.20 The parties
clearly contemplated the active use of the land for purposes beneficial
both to themselves and to the public generally. 21 Consequently the
point has been made that the rule against perpetuities-itself aimed at
freeing the use of land for such purposes-has here been so applied as
to do just the opposite. 22 This view seems to attach more importance
to the execution of commercial agreements than to the settlement of
outstanding interests in land. The same sentiment is expressed by the
dissent, which finds some support from Simes & Smith.23 The latter
authority, however, in turn rests upon three cases where the facts are
clearly distinguishable. 24 Each of these cases involved a trust, the sub-
ject matter of which was currently in existence. In Haggerty the
subject of the lease was only a contemplated building which might never
come into existence. If the lessor-builder experienced hardship and
could not perform, the lessee might insist upon "standing on his rights"
under the lease, take no legal action whatsoever, but refuse to dissolve
the contract. Should the lessor later desire to convey the land which
the building was to occupy, his prospective purchaser could reasonably
object that the title was encumbered.2 5 Thus it can be seen how realty
2o 47 I FL. REv. 197 (1959) ; 73 HARv. L. REv. 1318 (1960) ; 10 HAsTINs
L.J. 439 (1959); 6 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 165 (1959). The editor in 35 N.D.L. REV.
170 (1959) favored the majority decision. In a brief comment on the case, the
editor in 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 401 (1960) finds no fault with the result. He points
out to be safe this type of lease should have a provision for completion which
complies with the rule, but he describes both the majority and dissent as "well-
reasoned opinions."
2" "Haggerty and the city were obviously both satisfied with the arrangement,
so the city constructed the building and the management company is now operating
it under a slightly changed arrangement. The only losses, apart from Haggerty's,
are the professional reputation of the municipal attorney who drafted the instru-
ment and the lessee's attorney who accepted it." 73 HAuv. L. Ray. 1318, 1323(1960).
-( Commentary cited note 20 supra.
203 SIMS & SMITH, FUTURE INaREST § 1228 (2d ed. 1956). The author
states: "Occasionally one finds cases where vesting is, in effect, to take place 'in
a reasonable time,' and the court sometimes presumes that a reasonable time will
necessarily be within twenty-one years. If, in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, as a matter of construction, 'a reasonable time' is necessarily less than
twenty-one years, then such holdings are not subject to criticism." 3 SIMEs &
SMITH, op. cit. supra at 122.
" See Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885), where
trustees were to make gift effective three years after wife's death, or at such time,
earlier or later, as in their discretion would be expedient and practicable for settle-
ment of the estate; Plummer v. Brown, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926), where
trustees were to sell and distribute trust when it could be done to advantage and
without injury to the estate or beneficiaries; West Texas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Matlock, 212 S.W. 937 (Tex. Com. App. 1919), where trust was created to pay
a bonus to the first railroad passing through certain property within a reasonable
time.
"2 It is not altogether clear what interests or rights the would-be lessee does have
under a lease it; futuro, but it has been suggested that by the common law he
would have an interesse termini. And this is only a right to an estate at best, a
mere interest in the term. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 68 (Abr. ed. 1940).
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might become tied up for an indefinite period of time. In such a situa-
tion the rule against perpetuities provides the obvious solution, dissolv-
ing any rights the lessee might have had.
While the precise issue litigated in the principal case appears never
to have been before the North Carolina Supreme Court, there are indi-
cations that our court would reach the same result. The common law
rule against perpetuities is recognized and enforced in this state.2 6 A
fact situation similar to that in the principal case was before the North
Carolina court in Manufacturing Co. v. Hobbs.27 The action at the
trial level was conducted altogether on a question of fact as to whether
fraud had been committed by the plaintiff in inducing the contract.28
The contract was for the sale of timber and contained a provision which
allowed the plaintiff "the full term of five years within which to cut and
remove the timber hereby conveyed, said term to commence from the
time said party of the second part begins to manufacture said timber
into wood or lumber."2 9 The court did not comment on the fraud issue
but simply stated that "there is on the face of the pleadings an insuper-
able obstacle to recovery on the part of the plaintiff .... 30 This ob-
stacle was the fact that the interest might never become vested. That
the court had in mind a violation of the rule against perpetuities appears
obvious from a portion of the opinion which states, "It is evident from
the reading of the contract that the fee in the land was not to pass, and
yet no one can tell how long the land and other timber upon it may re-
main useless to the defendants and to the Commonwealth under the in-
definite and uncertain time at which the lease is to begin.'
This statement of the court sums up the necessity for the majority
decision in the principal case. Without a clear holding that the lease
violates the rule against perpetuities, the land might be tied up indefi-
nitely. It is submitted that courts in North Carolina, if faced with a
similar issue, would be on firm ground in following the majority in
Haggerty. To insure the validity of commercial leases of the type herein
discussed, it would seem advisable for the draftsmen always to insert a
saving clause in such leases. This clause should state that "if the com-
pletion of the building takes more than twenty years, then this lease and
contract are to be null and void." While such leases are not entirely
new to the business world,3 2 they are used much more frequently in
" Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949). See also N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 31: "Perpetuities ... ought not to be allowed."
27 128 N.C. 46, 38 S.E. 26 (1901).
2'" Id. at 47, 38 S.E. at 26.
-' Ibid.30 Ibid.1 Id. at 48, 38 S.E. at 26.
"An agreement to build and lease a garage, construction to start at once, was
the commercial transaction in the not too recent case of Monger v. Lutterloh, 195
N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 (1928).
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this era of supermarkets and shopping centers; and under the holding
of the principal case, they are certainly of questionable validity without
such a saving clause.
C. EDWIN ALLMAN, JR
Specific Performance-Oral Contracts to Devise-
Statute of Frauds.
In a recent Kentucky decision,' an illegitimate daughter brought suit
against her father's estate on his oral promise to devise real property to
her in consideration of her mother's foregoing the institution of bastardy
proceedings against him. The trial court held the oral contract un-
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but awarded damages on the
basis of quantum wieruit, measured by the value of the property promised
to be devised. On appeal, the court of appeals remanded with direc-
tions to enter a decree for specific performance of the contract if the
property was still vested in the heirs of the decedent and still available
for transfer to the plaintiff.
Uniformly, it is held that oral contracts to devise realty are within
the section of Statute of Frauds relating to contracts for the transfer
of real property.2 However, the majority of jurisdictions will grant
specific performance of the contract on the theory of part performance
where there has been a performance by the promisee which is incapable
of monetary evaluation.3 The rationale of these courts is that the Statute
of Frauds, which was designed to prevent fraud, should not be used to
perpetuate a fraud and that the equity of the promisee who has performed
in reliance upon the oral contract requires the specific deliverance of the
thing promised.4
Prior to the decision in the principal case Kentucky had repudiated
the doctrine of part performance as taking the oral contract out of the
'Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W2d 884 (Ky. 1960).2 E.g., Pocius v. Fleck, 13 Ill. 2d 420, 150 N.E2d 106 (1958); Griggs v. Oak,
164 Neb. 296, 82 N.W.2d 410 (1957); Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d
164 (1958); Hill v. Luck, 201 Va. 586, 112 S.E2d 858 (1960); 49 Am. JUn.
Statute of Frauds §215 (1943).
'Jones v. Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P2d 963 (1947) ; Jatcko v. Hoppe, 7 Ill. 2d
479, 131 N.E.2d 84 (1956); Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich. 651, 87 N.W.2d 330(1957); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956) ;
Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E2d 849 (1960). The courts have varied
widely in terminology and in description of the particular acts necessary to take
the oral contract out of the statute. See Parker v. Solomon, 171 Cal. App. 2d
125, 340 P.2d 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (equitable estoppel) ; Hurd v. Ball, 128
Ind. App. 278, 143 N.E.2d 458 (1957) (fraud). See generally Annot., 101 A.L.R.
923 (1936); Comment, 36 U. DET. LJ. 316 (1959).
' Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) ; Anselmo v. Beard-
more, 70 Idaho 392, 219 P.2d 946 (1950) ; Gladville v. McDole, 247 Ill. 34, 93 N.E.
86 (1910); Gossett v. Harris, 48 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
[Vol. 39
